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CALIFORNIA’S DATABASE BREACH NOTIFICATION SECURITY ACT:
THE FIRST STATE BREACH NOTIFICATION LAW IS NOT YET
A SUITABLE TEMPLATE FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY THEFT LEGISLATION
BY: TIMOTHY H. SKINNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
• In March 2003, hackers stole records that included the names, social security numbers,
addresses and e-mail addresses of 55,000 students and faculty from the University of
Texas at Austin.1
• In February 2003, a burglar stole a computer from Triwest Healthcare Association that
held the social security numbers and health records of 500,000 employees of the U.S.
Department of Defense.2
• In February 2003, a data processing center in Nebraska reported that eight million credit
card numbers were stolen from its servers.3
• In January 2003, the University of Kansas confirmed that the records of 1,400
international students were removed from its online system.4
• In January 2003, a Canadian insurance company warned 180,000 of its clients that their
personal information (including account details, beneficiaries, social insurance numbers,
pension fund values, and mothers’ maiden names) was at risk because the insurance
company’s computer services provider, IBM Information Systems Management, reported
that a hard drive that contained customer information was missing.5
• In April 2002, hackers broke into a California state database and accessed names, social
security numbers, and payroll information regarding 265,000 state employees.6
• In December 2002, laptops and hard drives were stolen from Tri West Health Care which
contained the names, addresses, telephone numbers, birth dates and social security
numbers of 562,000 members of the military and their dependents.7
{1} Attacks on poorly-secured information systems containing personal information are nearing
epidemic proportion. Hardly a month passes without a news story regarding a security breach
that exposed hundreds or thousands of data subjects’ personal information. As dependence on
e-Commerce continues to expand, personal information stolen from poorly secured systems is
becoming a multi-billion dollar industry.
{2} Since the birth of the Internet, legislative efforts have focused mainly on punishing the
offenders, generally referred to as “hackers,” rather than improving the quality of system
security.8 This emphasis originated with the legislative view that hackers with idle time on
their hands were the cause of the problem and that the exploitation of vulnerabilities in
organizations’ computer systems was merely the effect. In recent years, however, the paradigm
has begun to shift. Federal and state legislatures are beginning to view poor system security as
the cause of private information exposure and the malevolent behavior of hackers as the effect
of poor system security. As this new paradigm is shifting the onus from the hackers to those
hacked, the focus of information security is shifting from criminal law to civil law.
{3} This shift is reflected in recent California legislation: the Database Breach Notification
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Security Act (“SB 1386”).9 For the first time, a legislature shattered the aging paradigm
and at least implicitly, focused on a first line of defense: securing the systems that store
personal information.10 SB 1386 is unique in that it requires California state government
agencies, organizations, and persons that do business in California (collectively referred to as
“organizations” herein) to promptly notify California “residents” when they have a reasonable
belief that a system breach occurred which possibly exposed data subjects’ personal information
to third parties.11 Although SB 1386 has many notable deficiencies, it does provide a good
starting point for addressing the issue of security breach notification and maintains a good
balance between the interests of corporations and their data subjects.12
{4} It is important to understand the background and circumstances that led to the enactment of
SB 1386 before analyzing its provisions and impact. Part II of this article will focus on computer
security breaches and the resulting rise in identity theft that caused the California legislature
to pass this bill. Part III will discuss the creation of SB 1386 and its strengths and weaknesses.
Part IV will study efforts to require breach notification at the federal level. Part V will address
the curative or protective measures that should be taken by: (1) organizations wishing to
avoid a breach; and (2) individuals whose personal information was disclosed as a result of a
security breach. Part VI will conclude by finding that using SB 1386 as the template for federal
legislation would be unwise, unless the issues discussed herein are addressed.
II. SECURITY BREACHES AND THE RISE OF IDENTITY THEFT
A. Security Breaches
{5} According to one online security firm, the average U.S. company’s computer security is
attacked by intruders thirty times per week.13 These intrusions are known as security breaches.
What constitutes a security breach will vary depending on the source of the definition. The most
generic definition of security breach is a successful attack on a computer system’s security
controls in order to penetrate the system to acquire or corrupt information on the system, thus
disrupting the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the information on the system.
{6} Security breaches can come from outside an organization – for example, via hackers trying
to break into the system. Breaches may also come from inside, typically from disgruntled
employees, embezzlers, or even system administrators who have viewed information they are
not authorized to access.14 To date, most breaches come from within organizations. Employees
either exploit their legitimate access to data or exceed their authority to view data otherwise
restricted by company policy. There is evidence, however, that this trend is changing.15
{7} A large part of the problem is that computer security is not viewed as a priority by many
organizations. More importantly, it is not viewed as a priority by the people who authorize
funding of security initiatives within organizations. There is not a strong organizational culture
of data security throughout many organizations, even though they maintain or have access to
the personal data of millions of Americans. This is due in part to the relative ‘newness’ of the
electronic age, but . . . [is] more attributable to the absence of law and policy that would require
organizations to take seriously the issues of data security and policy. 16
For example, although eighty-percent of the companies participating in one study reported that
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they had a security policy in place, only forty-seven percent said that this policy was embraced
by line and functional leaders.17
{8} There are commonly two types of security breach victims.18 The first is the person or
organization that suffers from the breach and the second is the data subject whose personal
information is contained on the system that was attacked. Generally, the data subject is a
consumer who provided information to a business in order to purchase goods or obtain some
other service, but might also be an employee whose personal information was provided to an
employer to secure employment or employee benefits, or a patient at a hospital or doctor’s
office, or even a law firm’s client.
{9} As noted above, the purpose of most malevolent breaches is to gain access to information.
Sometimes breaches are, however, designed to gain an unfair advantage in the marketplace.
Other times, and with growing frequency, the purpose of security breaches is to access personal
information to commit identity theft.
B. The Rise of Identity Theft
{10} Identity theft is the taking of another person’s social security number, date of birth, or other
personal information for the purpose of assuming the data subject’s identity in order to secure
goods and services on the data subject’s accounts.19 Identity thieves may also use the victim’s
information to secure employment or apply for government services.20 Credit reporting agencies
reported a rise in identity theft cases from 35,235 in 1992 to 522,922 in 1997.21
{11} The FTC reported that identity theft complaints nearly doubled between 2001 and 2002.22
In 2002, the FTC reported receiving 218,714 reports of possible or actual identity theft.23 The
U.S. Department of Justice estimates that as many as 700,000 U.S. consumers may fall prey
to identity theft each year.24 These complaints account for forty-three percent of the consumer
fraud complaints filed.25 A nationwide study conducted in 2002 revealed that one in twenty
people was a victim of identity theft.26 According to the U.S. Treasury, the cost of this illegal
conduct is between two and three billion dollars per year for credit cards alone.27
{12} Varying estimates have been given for the amount of “out of pocket” expenses that afflict
the average victim of identity theft.28 The range is anywhere from $800.00 to $1,100.00.29
The following additional identity theft damages have been noted: personal time spent fixing
problems with personal accounts, loss of productivity, emotional distress, higher mortgage
and interest rates, lack of purchasing power, and loss of vacation time spent dealing with theft
issues.30 The personal time the average victim spends attempting to restore his identity31 is 175
hours.32
{13} Victims usually do not discover that someone has stolen their identity until fourteen months
after the information is acquired.33 Once discovered, it can take years to clear up identity
theft issues.34 Part of the problem is that merchants rarely tell customers about breaches
voluntarily.35 Instead, they wait for customers to complain about unauthorized activities. 36 The
result of businesses withholding information from the public is that the government is less
equipped to get an overall understanding of where resources should be applied, thus making
the nation more vulnerable to cyber-attacks.37 Moreover, if organizations do not report breaches
to law enforcement authorities, the hackers remain in obscurity, free to act with impunity. In an
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effort to curb computer security breaches and to empower victims of identity theft, the State of
California enacted the first state computer security breach notification legislation in the United
States.
III. THE CREATION OF AND REACTION TO SB 1386
{14} SB 1386 has become a hot topic in security and business circles nationwide.38 One author
believes that because of California’s size and leading role in the high-tech industry, SB 1386
“could create a de facto national disclosure policy” even absent the passage of federal legislation
on the subject.39 Others have noted that this law could have a global effect.40 In order to
understand the circumstances that led to the passage of this law, it is important to understand its
history.
A. History of SB 1386
{15} On April 2, 2002, the Stephen P. Teale Data Center (“Data Center”), a state-operated data
storage facility41 in California, was breached by an unknown attacker.42 The Data Center houses
social security numbers, first and middle initials, last names, and payroll deduction amounts
on full and part-time California state employees.43 The personal information of all 265,000
state employees was potentially exposed during the breach.44 Although the Data Center breach
occurred on April 5, 2002, it was not discovered until May 7, 2002, and employees were not
notified until May 21, 2002.45 The breach was discovered during routine maintenance on the
system on May 7.46 According to Kathleen Connell, the Controller for the State of California, the
Controller’s Office then directed the Data Center to “disconnect” the computer that had been
breached.47 At that point, the Controller’s Office’s representative on the Sacramento Valley Hi
Tech Crime Task Force was notified of the breach.48 The Task Force then took control of the
criminal investigation.49 The Task Force then advised the Data Center to determine whether any
information was removed.50 The Task Force also told the Data Center not to report the breach
during the investigation.51
{16} A spokesman for the Governor of California suggested shortly after the breach that the
state did everything it could to prevent the break-in.52 During the investigation, however, it
was discovered that the server that was breached sat outside the Data Center’s firewall.53 No
explanation was given for this anomaly. Shortly after the incident, state officials also reported
concern over the ease with which the hackers accessed the system.54 The Data Center operators
admitted they actually employed few of the existing Data Center security procedures in place to
protect the system.55
{17} Furthermore, after the attack, conflicting information was reported regarding the regular
maintenance of patches at the Data Center.56 Early reports stated that patches57 that should
have been installed at the Data Center prior to the incident were not operating.58 A California
Controller’s Office representative indicated, however, that the Data Center applied a required
patch to one of two servers that held state employee payroll deduction information, but not the
one that was breached.59 This representative admitted that if the patch had been installed on
both servers, “that attack would not have been successful.”60
{18} The Data Center director was less than reassuring on the issue of whether personal
information had been viewed, downloaded or printed during the attack. He suggested that
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in order to actually steal, as opposed to merely viewing information, the hacker would need
to penetrate a series of password-protected areas.61 Of course, he could not say for certain
whether this was accomplished.62 In subsequent testimony before a California State Senate
subcommittee, the director was quoted as saying “I don’t think we will ever be one-hundred
percent sure that the data has not been compromised.”63 Despite this lack of certainty, the
director also reportedly stated that there was no evidence that the hacker had downloaded,
printed or even accessed the state workers’ personal information.64 It is more likely, however,
that the Data Center simply had no information to prove or disprove this theory.65 Although
it could not be directly tied to this particular breach, at least one state employee reported
suspicious activities that indicated the strong possibility of identity theft following the breach.66
{19} Shortly after the Data Center breach, California State Senator Steve Peace announced that
he would be delving into these issues during a June 12, 2002, hearing designed to start the
process for preventing further attacks.67 Shortly thereafter, Senator Peace reworked pre-existing
bill SB 1386 to address the Data Center issues.68 The principle features of the final version SB
1386 as enacted are as follows:
• Businesses, California state government agencies, and individuals who conduct
business in California or own or license computerized personal information are
required to disclose “any breach of the security of [California residents’]. . . data. . .
following discovery or notification of the breach.”69
• “Breach of the security of the system70 means the unauthorized acquisition of
computerized data that compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of
personal information” on the system.71 The breach does not need to be reported
unless the personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been,
acquired by an unauthorized person.”72
• If an employee or agent acquires the information in good faith “for the purposes
of the agency” and the information is not disclosed further, it does not constitute
a breach.73
• Personal information is an individual’s first name or first initial and last name in
combination with a(n): (1) social security number;74 (2) California driver’s license
or California Identification Card number; and/or (3) account number, credit or
debit card number, in combination with the security or access code or password
that would allow access to the account. 75 Notice of breaches of publicly available
information alone is not required.76
• The disclosure must be “expedient” and made “without unreasonable delay.”77
• If a California resident is harmed by the agency’s failure to give notice as required
by the Act, s/he may bring a civil suit for damages, injunctive relief and any other
relief allowed by law. 78
• Notice of the breach need not be given right away if measures are being taken
to determine the scope of the breach and “restore reasonable integrity to the
system.”79
• Notice of the breach need not be given right away if the delay is “consistent with
the legitimate needs of law enforcement.” Once law enforcement determines
that notification will not “compromise” the investigation, notice must be given.80
• Notice, as defined by SB 1386, is any of the following: written, electronic,
or substitute notice.81 Substitute notice is only appropriate when written or
electronic notice would cost in excess of $250,000.00 or the party does not have
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enough information to do the other forms of notice.82
• If the personal information subject to the breach was “encrypted,” no notification is
required.83
• The Act was effective July 1, 2003.84
B. Pros and Cons of Notice
{20} The notification provision is the heart of SB 1386.85 On the surface, the benefits of notice
appear to be obvious. Beth Givens, Director of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse in San Diego,
stated that the key to preventing identity theft is early detection. According to Givens, “the earlier
you know, the easier it is for you to stop the damage.”86 The more time that passes following a
breach, the lower the chance that the information will be used,87 because criminals who possess
this type of information tend to act quickly.88 Consumers who receive early notice of such
breaches can cancel their credit cards and contact credit bureaus in order to prevent thieves from
opening bogus accounts.89
{21} Some argue, however, that data subjects gain no real advantage by receiving early notice
of a breach.90 In effect, public notice of the breach gives hackers the notoriety they crave.91
Moreover, credit card companies suggest that when credit card numbers are acquired during
a breach, consumers do not need to know because they are protected by “zero liability” or “no
fault” consumer protection.92 This “protection,” however, can be illusory, mainly because many
credit card companies require their cardholders to review their statements for unauthorized
transactions. If the cardholders do not catch the transactions within a reasonable time period,
the credit card companies may counter that the cardholders have been grossly negligent in
reviewing their bills.93 If cardholders know that there have been breaches with respect to their
credit information, at least they can monitor their billing statements with jaundiced eyes. They
may also decide to cancel their credit cards or request new credit cards and numbers in order to
avoid the possibility that they might inadvertently overlook fraudulent transactions. If customers
are not given this option and they fail to notice fraudulent transactions, their SB 1386 or common
law complaints against the credit card companies for improper security or failure to provide
notice may be countered with claims of comparative negligence or breach of contract.
{22} Whatever the strength of zero liability policies may be, the California Senate did not agree
with this argument. As noted in the comments from the June 18, 2002 hearing of the Assembly
Committee on Judiciary:
All too often events of this sort go completely unreported. How can this
be? The embarrassment of disclosure that a company or agency was
“hacked,” or the fear of lost business based upon shoddy information
security practices being disclosed overrides the need to inform the affected
persons. In other instances, credit card issuers, telephone companies and
internet service providers, along with state and local officials “handle” the
access of consumer’s personal and financial information by unauthorized
persons internally, often absorbing the losses caused by fraud as a matter of
“customer service” without ever informing the customer of the unauthorized
use of his/her account.94
{23} The California Senate was not only concerned with the effect a particular loss of credit
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information might have on consumers in their contractual relationship with their credit card
companies, but also with empowering cardholders and other data subjects to give them a voice
in the decision-making process once their personal information is stolen.
C. Scope of the Notice Provision
{24} The scope of the notice provision places organizations in a bind because they must decide
whether to give the minimum notice required by law or go beyond the express requirements.
For example, analysts have warned that relying on the strict requirements of SB 1386 and
merely notifying California customers of breaches is not advisable.95 Notifying only Californians
may not only subject the organization to criticism,96 but businesses may simply find it easier
to notify everyone rather than merely notifying California residents.97 The bottom line is that
“[c]ompanies do not want to get to the point of notification.”98 “Therefore, they have powerful
incentive to secure data from the beginning.”99
{25} Due to the complex nature of online transactions, it will be difficult to determine who must
provide notice under SB 1386. This issue arises because data travels through intermediaries
during online transactions.100 It is, therefore, difficult to determine whether the sender’s or
recipient’s information has been breached. SB 1386 leaves these questions unanswered.
{26} Once a breach has occurred and notice is required, an organization is immediately faced
with the daunting task of assessing whether any of the data subjects whose information was
potentially exposed were residents of California.
D. Conducting Business in California and Storing Information on its Residents
{27} Virtually every online merchant sells its products to California residents.101 In accordance
with the Act, storing confidential information pertaining to a single California resident on a
single computer will require compliance.102 No physical office or other property in California
is required.103 According to Scott Pink, Deputy Chair of the American Bar Association’s
Cybersecurity Task Force, “[i]f you are selling products or providing services to residents of
California, it would probably be determined that you’re conducting business in California under
this law.”104 If a company maintains personal information on a potential customer, former
customer, or other California resident on its system, then it must comply.105
{28} SB 1386 fails to establish criteria for determining whether data subjects whose personal
information is involved in a suspected breach are residents of California.106 Opponents of the
law have noted that it is virtually impossible to determine which persons in a database are
residents of California, mainly because the database owners often collect no information from
the users that would allow this assessment to take place.107 Even where residency information
is obtained during a transaction, a customer who is a California resident at the time of the
transaction may cease to be a resident at the time the breach occurs. The opposite is also
true: a customer who is a non-California resident at the time of the transaction could become
a California resident before the breach without the company’s knowledge.108 For this reason,
many companies have legitimately criticized the bill for failing to provide a method by which
a database owner can determine whether a data subject is a California resident,109 especially
where only e-mail or IP addresses were collected at the time of the transaction.110
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{29} Organizations are uncertain whether the courts will employ the legal definition of “resident”
used for establishing venue. It is also uncertain whether California courts will require businesses
to regularly contact data subjects to update information regarding their residency. Businesses
that rely solely on data received at the point at which they originally gathered information from
the subject could find themselves at risk of civil suit under SB 1386. From a privacy perspective,
it is ironic that the law could actually require that businesses insist on collecting and storing more
information regarding California data subjects at the time of a transaction than ever before.111
{30} Organizations should update their customer contact information on a regular basis to avoid
using SB 1386’s public notice procedures.112 This suggestion originates from the idea that
a company is better advised to notify the individual customers affected rather than making a
public announcement, because such an announcement will easily reach unaffected and potential
customers as well. Although such an approach does not guarantee that the matter will not be
exposed to the general public anyway, it may limit the scope of the unpleasant advertisement.
{31} Organizations must also consider the liability implications of only notifying California
residents to the exclusion of all other data subjects.113 One law firm has recommended that
companies notify every potentially affected data subject in the United States in the event
of a breach.114 Segregating California residents for notice of breaches could create liability
implications with respect to non-Californians who fail to also receive notice.115
E. Vagueness of Language Used
{32} Perhaps the most maligned aspect of the bill is its use of undefined terms. “Modern
legislators simply do not understand [technology],” and this lack of understanding causes them
to create vague legislation at the request of lobbyists and public interest groups.116 Assailed as a
byproduct of this problem, SB 1386’s lack of definitions for key terms will make compliance for
organizations and enforcement for the courts very difficult.
1. “Reasonable Belief” that “Acquisition” of Data Has Occurred
{33} As noted above, SB 1386 requires notification of data subjects once an organization has
a reasonable belief that data acquisition has occurred. Thus, the law does not require actual
proof that personal information has been compromised before notice is required. In other words,
SB 1386 is not simply limited to situations where an organization knows a California resident’s
personal information has been acquired without authorization. Instead, the law expands
the notice requirement to encompass situations where it is “reasonably believed” that such
information has been acquired.117 The “reasonably believed” language, therefore, requires notice
to California residents even if an organization merely “suspects” the unauthorized acquisition of
information.118 Because reasonable belief that an acquisition has occurred is all that is required,
mere access to data, not actual theft or use119 of the information will trigger the statute’s costly
notice provision.120
{34} The Investment Company Institute (ICI), a coalition that represents the mutual fund industry,
argued during the California Senate legislative proceedings for SB 1386 that this provision will
not only be expensive for organizations to implement,121 but it will unnecessarily alarm citizens
who receive notice.122 Therefore, the practical result of this bill may be a rash of false alarms
delivered via the notice required by this law, even though no actual acquisition of customer
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information has occurred.123 This may result in the erosion of consumer confidence in Internet
transactions124 and cause companies to lose customers.125 A barrage of notices warning
consumers of security breaches might also eventually desensitize consumers and cause them
to ignore the notices.126 On the other hand, notification requirements may cause companies to
improve information security, thus increasing consumer confidence.127
{35} Moreover, many organizations may not know that there has been a breach until employees
start receiving bills or calls for charges they did not incur.128 This occurs, in part, because it is
difficult to prove that confidential data was not stolen once a computer system is breached.129
This situation occurs most often with systems that either lack intrusion detection capability130
or have logging capabilities that are not implemented or are improperly configured. It may also
happen simply because a company lacks security measures that would allow any monitoring of
their systems. Whatever the monitoring capability of a particular system may be, the Act itself
is silent on the method that must be used to discover breaches.131 Therefore, it is conceivable
that under SB 1386, a company might take the position that it will take no affirmative action to
discover that a breach has occurred, thus “keeping itself in the dark” in order to delay or avoid
the expense and embarrassment of notice.132 Although SB 1386 itself may not specifically
require that companies employ a monitoring system to discover breaches, this does not mean
that such an obligation would not be imposed by a court under contract or tort theories.133 It is,
therefore, the combination of SB 1386 and the prospect of tort and contract liability that results
in the inescapable conclusion that employing tools to deter or detect security breaches is an
implicit requirement of SB 1386.
{36} Other opponents of the terms “reasonably believed” and “acquired” cite the fact that it is
difficult to discern what would constitute knowledge of a breach.134 Because of this vagueness,
it would, therefore, be plausible for a court interpreting SB 1386 to hold that any semblance
of unauthorized activity triggers the disclosure requirements, especially where an organization
does not employ adequate logging or intrusion detection systems to prove otherwise.135 It is
more likely, however, that organizations will be required to notify consumers at the point where
they know the intruder has accessed personal information, thus putting himself in a position to
copy, download or print it. Organizations that employ intrusion detection software and logging
devices may be able to determine that an intruder has not accessed personal information, thus
saving themselves the cost and humiliation of notification. Therefore, organizations which
do not employ intrusion detection and other forensic tools which allow tracing of a hacker’s
movements before and after the system is penetrated may actually find themselves giving
notice to California residents more often than those who have this tracing capability.
{37} As SB 1386 made its way through the legislative process, many businesses lobbied for
language that would require proof of actual acquisition before notice is required. The Senate
clearly intended to create a proactive bill that empowers data subjects before their stolen
data is exploited. Proof of an actual acquisition, as opposed to a reasonable belief that data
was acquired, would necessarily require harm to a data subject before the notice provision is
triggered. After all, if actual acquisition were the standard, the only real proof of acquisition
would be a case of identity theft involving a data subject whose information was obtained during
the breach.136 The authors of SB 1386, however, intended to be proactive in stopping identity
theft. Therefore, the California Senate did not allow organizations to wait until a data subject
was actually harmed before requiring notification.
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{38} It is also possible that the California Senate considered the limits of current technology in
assessing the point at which notice must be given. If the California Senate required “acquisition”
rather than mere access before notification is required, technology would have to exist to prove
this distinction. It would also render SB 1386 meaningless unless an organization has intrusion
detection software sophisticated enough to determine when or if information was actually
downloaded or copied.137 Because current intrusion detection software can only determine when
information has been accessed, reasonable belief of acquisition must necessarily occur once an
organization knows that access has occurred. Even if intrusion detection software could show
that information was not accessed and downloaded, it is impossible to say with any certainty that
the hacker did not simply write down the accessed information with an old-fashioned pen and
paper.138
{39} This issue is further complicated when the attack is committed by gaining access to, and
subsequently employing, a legitimate user’s ID and authentication. This type of breach is virtually
impossible to detect regardless of the strength of the system’s security, because many intrusion
detection software packages are designed only to detect anomalies, not what appears to be
normal user behavior.139 The only way to detect such an intrusion is if the unauthorized user
exceeds the scope of authority granted to the legitimate user by the system administrator.140
When a legitimate user’s access information is employed, provided that the user’s authorization
is not exceeded, an organization may never know that a breach has occurred until data subjects
start experiencing identity theft problems.141
2. Why Only Electronic and Not Paper Records?
{40} As noted above, the definition of breach, which triggers the notice requirement, only
applies to “the unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security,
confidentiality, or integrity of personal information” on the system.142 From the perspective
of privacy advocates, the most frustrating thing about SB 1386 is the fact that it is limited to
electronic breaches, even though theft of papers records carries the same potential for identity
theft.143 For example, in 2002, Ligand Pharmaceuticals in San Diego settled a negligence suit
with employees whose identities were stolen when it failed to protect personal information
contained in paper records.144 The records in question came from a company acquired by
Ligand.145 The files stolen contained social security numbers, names, birth dates and other data.
A lab worker who discovered documents in boxes in a storage closet stole the information.146 The
employee then used the data to rent apartments, to open cellular phone accounts and twenty-five
credit card accounts to which $100,000 in goods were charged.147 Ligand reportedly settled with
the affected employees out of court for a “significant six-figure amount.”148 This theft occurred
despite the fact that Ligand had very strict policies for safeguarding its records.149
{41} Even if the records in the Ligand files contained information pertaining to a California
resident, and even if the theft had occurred after July 1, 2003, SB 1386 would not have required
Ligand to notify customers of this breach of its physical (as opposed to its electronic) security.150
Although some argue that electronic data can be more easily transmitted in large quantities and,
therefore, requires faster notice to stop the rapid spread of information, this argument will be of
little help to the individual California resident whose data is stolen from paper records. Breach
notification laws should address breaches of paper as well as of electronic records.
3. Conflicting Laws
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{42} As SB 1386 made its way through the legislative process, opponents also criticized the bill
because of its potential to conflict with federal law. One opponent noted that with the myriad
of potentially conflicting federal and state laws facing corporations, they are “bewildered to
comply with what appears to be several moving targets.”151 The president of the Software and
Information Industry Association (SIIA), Ken Wasch, also suggested that compliance under SB
1386 would, “in all likelihood, conflict with the requirements of Federal laws such as GrammLeach-Bliley and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), potentially subjecting
companies to conflicting liability requirements.”152 It has also been suggested that federal laws,
such as the Early Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), may preempt SB 1386 to the extent
it is applies to ERISA plans and group or multi-employer health plans.153
{43} Furthermore, it has been argued that the bill reflects an attempt to regulate interstate
commerce by forcing companies outside of California to comply with its notice requirements
when they store California residents’ information. The power to regulate interstate commerce is
reserved to the federal government under Article 8, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution.154
F. Notice Exemptions
1. Encryption
{44} The most often discussed and questioned feature of SB 1386 is what has been referred to
as the encryption “exemption.” The authors of SB 1386 exempted encrypted data from the bill’s
definition of breach. In discussing this purported safe harbor, one storage security vendor Vice
President stated that the law “is scary for any company. But if you’re encrypted, you don’t have
to abide.”155 However, a close examination of the encryption exemption creates more questions
than it answers. It would be more accurate to say that encryption may, but does not necessarily,
result in exemption from the Act’s notification requirements.156
{45} The main source of confusion is the fact that SB 1386 does not define the strength or
level of the encryption that will exempt an organization from SB 1386’s notice requirements.157
The law does not expressly state that the encryption needs to be strong158 or even reasonable.
Furthermore, the California Senate did not expressly require a level of encryption similar to that
currently used in any particular area of the economy.159 For example, the authors could have
required organizations affected by the bill to employ the encryption standard used by the federal
government to protect sensitive information.160 This omitted definition may cause organizations
to feel more secure with their level of encryption than they should. It also might cause them to
invest161 in encryption technology that exceeds their needs and reduces system efficiency.
{46} Part of the problem with SB 1386 is that its authors appear to equate “encryption” with
“security.” Encryption, however, is not supposed to be the primary source of security.162 It is
designed to supplement an overall risk-based program.163 It is part of the solution, not the
solution. When considering encryption as part of a security program, a broad selection of
encryption devices are available, ranging from those that are relatively easy to break to those
that are virtually impossible to bypass with current technology.164 Most encryption is done
when transmitting data.165 Secure Socket Layer166 (SSL) is the technology most commonly
employed to encrypt information when transferring it between computers over the internet.167
Attacks on the data can, however, occur both before and after transitory encryption takes
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place.168 Although the type of encryption envisioned by SB 1386 is not stated, the bill must
necessarily be referring to encrypting data as it rests on the system as well as encrypting it
during transmission.169 Encryption of data while at rest in the database is a far less common
security method.170 The problem is that encrypting data at rest leads to a serious “degradation of
service.”171 It simply is not possible or practical to encrypt all data all the time.”172
{47} SB 1386 is also flawed because the encryption provision reflects a lack of understanding of
technology.173 By failing to define encryption, the California Senate created future difficulty for
organizations hoping to prove that they have encrypted their data and are therefore entitled to
exemption from SB 1386’s notice requirements. Once the data is stolen and a plaintiff brings
suit against a defendant for failure to give notice of the breach under SB 1386, the defendant
who experienced the breach will need to prove that the data was encrypted at the time it was
acquired from the system. Unfortunately, even a security professional or forensic investigator
might not be able to tell whether the data stolen was encrypted at the time it was taken from
the system.174 At best, the defendant will be able to say that it had an encryption policy in place,
employed the necessary technology to encrypt the data, and did everything else it could to ensure
that data was encrypted whenever possible.
{48} Furthermore, the use of encryption may reduce liability, but only if it is properly installed,
configured and managed.175 A defendant’s success in using the encryption defense will depend
heavily on proof that it took measures to ensure the integrity of its encryption key. Often,
encryption key management systems are deployed but are not efficient and secure.176 The
potential exposure under SB 1386 requires that organizations not only encrypt their data, but
also limit access to the program that encrypts and decrypts information.177 In other words, even
if the company encrypted all information on its systems as it rests in its database as well as
in transit, the encrypted information may still be compromised depending on how the breach
occurs.178 For example, if an employee of the organization is able to secure the encryption key
and access and copy the data in unencrypted format, even though she is not authorized to do
so as part of her duties, the damage may be done in spite of an otherwise vigorous encryption
policy.179 Therefore, even organizations undertaking the burdensome task of encrypting all
of the information on their systems, at rest and in transit, may lose the so-called encryption
“exemption” unless they manage their encryption keys properly.180 It should also be noted that
even if the information is stolen in encrypted format, once that information is decrypted, or if the
organization acquires a reasonable belief that the data was not actually encrypted at the time of
the theft, SB 1386’s disclosure provisions will likely be triggered.181
{49} Organizations using encryption must also be realistic when it is being applied to static
information such as social security numbers, driver’s license numbers and other data that does
not change over time. A thief could easily download this information after breaching the system
and then keep the encrypted information until technology exists to crack the encryption.182 If the
organization reasonably believes that the encryption has been cracked, notice will be required
even if that reasonable belief is acquired many years after the initial breach and acquisition
of the information. It is also important to note that when encryption is employed, it must
be applied with respect to every copy of the data and on every system on which the data is
housed.183 This includes individual employees’ desktops and laptops.184 From the foregoing,
it is clear that meeting the standards that will probably be required to successfully employ the
encryption exemption is not as easy as it initially appears.
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2. Temporary Law Enforcement Exemption
{50} As discussed above, notice of the breach need not be given immediately if the delay is
“consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement.” If an organization reports the
breach to the police, it need not provide immediate notification to data subjects provided this
delay is necessary to the investigation.185 Notification can also be delayed while the company
determines the scope of the breach and restores the integrity of the system.186 Once integrity is
restored, however, notice must be given if it will not “compromise” the investigation.
{51} This exemption may have a positive effect if it results in an increase in the number of
incidents reported to police, something law enforcement has long-awaited.187 The drawback
of the exemption is that it temporarily thwarts the purpose of the bill—alerting consumers
immediately so that they can be proactive in protecting themselves from identity theft.188 It is
unclear whether a law enforcement agency, as opposed to the organization itself, must decide
when delayed notice is appropriate to meet “the legitimate needs of law enforcement.” This
issue arises because SB 1386 does not state by whom the decision must be made. Courts will
most likely require that this decision be made by some law enforcement agency somewhere
in the country. Law enforcement agencies in California will be under pressure to disclose the
existence of the breach as soon as possible.189 Because the bill has an impact on databases
outside of California, however, the success of enforcement will heavily depend on the will of law
enforcement authorities in other jurisdictions to vigorously apply the law enforcement provision.
This aspect of the bill introduces politics to the enforcement process and gives rise to the
possibility that law enforcement agencies outside of California may be encouraged by political
pressure to protect local companies by conducting detailed and methodical (yet legitimate)
investigations, thus expanding the time before notice must be given.190 This could be deemed a
significant advantage for organizations operating outside of California.
{52} The temptation may be to go to law enforcement immediately in order to help the
organization “buy time” to plan and strategize.191 Organizations have to be careful, however,
not to overemphasize the law enforcement “safe harbor” as a means of unreasonably delaying
notice. Although the investigation could take a great deal of time, nothing in the law allows this
to be used as a means of indefinitely putting off notice to consumers. Moreover, nothing in the
law requires consumers to wait until the completion of a law enforcement investigation before
filing suit for negligence or breach of contract associated with the incident. If information
pertaining to the breach is leaked to data subjects who have experienced actual losses as
a result of a breach, they are free to file suit against the organization under common law or
statutory theories of negligence and breach of contract without waiting for the completion of the
criminal investigation.
{53} In the end, the decision to notify law enforcement must be made in consultation with
counsel.192 The company must weigh the loss of control over the investigation against the
benefit of the delay provided by this temporary safe harbor. Getting law enforcement involved
early may lead to quick apprehension of the culprit. It may also lessen the impact on the
company’s reputation if police announce the security breach to the public and simultaneously
announce that the hacker has been arrested.193 The possibility of being in a position of
delivering positive news of the arrest with the negative news of the breach might tip the scales
in favor of seeking help from law enforcement at the outset.
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{54} Overall, the law enforcement provision is a necessary evil in balancing the interests of
organizations and individuals. As noted above, however, organizations must be careful not to rely
on this provision for long periods of time. Organizations must avoid over-reliance on this provision
in order to avert the embarrassing possibility of the breach disclosure coming from another
source. If data subjects are less angry when they hear of the breach, they are less likely to pursue
litigation.
G. SB 1386 Authorizes Private Right of Action
1. Narrow Cause of Action
{55} Much ado has been made about the possibility that SB 1386 will lead to class action
lawsuits and large judgments in civil suits.194 The bill itself, however, only addresses a very
narrow security breach liability issue. This law does not create a new cause of action against an
organization for permitting a computer security breach to occur. It merely requires that breached
organizations give notice once they have a reasonable belief that a data subject’s personal
information has been acquired. It is the failure to give notice, rather than the failure to prevent a
breach from occurring, that triggers the right to file a civil suit for damages under SB 1386.
{56} SB 1386 limits damages to those arising from an organization’s failure to give notice of the
breach. Therefore, a plaintiff seeking damages under this bill would have to show that: (1) the
defendant’s system was breached; (2) the plaintiff is a California resident; (3) the defendant had
a reasonable belief that the plaintiff’s personal information (as defined in SB 1386) was acquired
during the breach; (4) the defendant failed to give plaintiff notice as required by the bill; and (5)
the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of defendant’s failure to give her notice. The plaintiff
will have the burden of proving that she is a California resident and suffered damages, but will
also have to prove that it is more likely than not that she suffered damages as a result of the
defendant’s failure to give her notice.195
{57} Plaintiffs seeking to hold an organization accountable for damages that arise from the
security breach itself will need to look outside SB 1386. The duty to exercise due care in
protecting information from breach will be found in existing state and federal statutes196 and
the common law. These sources of law will provide the vehicles that will drive litigation in this
area. For example, even before the enactment of SB 1386, when a system breach occurred, the
data subject already had the option of filing suit for negligence or breach of contract197 under
appropriate circumstances. Therefore, public anger arising as a result of an organization’s
failure to give notice under SB 1386 will more likely serve as a catalyst that leads to the filing
of a negligence or contract cause of action than as the sole cause of action in a case arising as
a result of a computer security breach. In other words, any attorney pleading a case under SB
1386 for failure to give notice will necessarily include a negligence or contract claim to address
any negligence that may have caused the breach itself.
2. Only “Customers” May Sue?
{58} SB 1386 limits the right to sue to “customers”, yet another term undefined by the bill. The
bill refers to data subjects generically throughout the bill, but then mysteriously limits the right
to sue to “customers.” This is unusual because the bill’s notice requirement is not only imposed
on companies (which have customers), but on California government agencies and individuals
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as well. The use of the word “customer” would also appear to limit a company’s employees
from suing it for failing to give notice of a breach unless the employee is also a customer of the
business.198 The use of the term “customer” would also seem to remove suits against the State
of California from its remedies unless the data subject could somehow prove that he or she was
a “customer” of the state. This is ironic because it was a breach of employee information in a
California state database that caused the bill to be passed in the first place.199 Therefore, in the
end, SB 1386 does not even address the specific circumstances that lead to its passage. This
provision needs to be amended by the California legislature to allow suit by employees and all
persons affected by an organization’s failure to give timely notice.
H. SB 1386 Does Not Expressly Require Organizations to Establish a Security Program
{59} SB 1386 stops short of expressly requiring the implementation of a security program.
There is, however, no question that SB 1386 implicitly sends the message that organizations
and persons must “prevent, detect and monitor intrusions.”200 For example, it encourages
organizations to employ encryption (which is only part of a security program). It also rewards
companies that monitor their systems closely enough to recognize when activities reach
the point where it is reasonable to conclude that personal information has been acquired.
Companies that do not closely monitor activities on their systems may find themselves sending
notices every time their intrusion detection system reveals an anomaly. Despite these efforts
to reward a sound security program, nothing in SB 1386 expressly requires an organization to
implement a security program. 201 The only duty expressly required in the bill is to give notice
of a breach once reasonable belief of data acquisition occurs. The duty to safeguard personal
information will be found outside SB 1386, in federal statutes,202 contract law or negligence law.
IV. IS THERE A SOLUTION AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL?
A. SB 1386 Is At Odds With the Bush Administration Approach
{60} SB 1386 takes an approach that is at odds with the Bush Administration’s cyber security
policy. The Administration favors self-regulation and secret disclosures203 to select government
agencies, rather than public warnings.204 The Administration has opposed breach notification
and federally mandated security standards in favor of accommodating business concerns
and encouraging voluntary submission205 of information regarding breaches.206 The Bush
Administration avoided this type of disclosure law in developing its cybersecurity policy, as
stated in The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.207 The rapid growth of fraud and identity
theft may give the Bush Administration little choice but to promote consumer notice over
corporate self-regulation.
B. Federal Legislation
{61} The Bush Administration’s pro-business approach has not stopped the introduction of two
bills pending before the U.S. Congress. Although businesses do not generally support breach
notification legislation, they do agree that if there is going to be legislation in this area, it should
be addressed at the federal level rather than through piecemeal state legislation.208 The fear
is that if the individual states all create conflicting legislation requiring breach notification,
organizations that do business nationwide will be buried in an avalanche of what could be
conflicting obligations. The U.S. Senate currently has a bill pending that might avoid this feared
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piecemeal approach. There is also a bill pending in the House of Representatives that would
require breach notification in the banking industry.
1. Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act
{62} On June 26, 2003, just five days before the effective date of SB 1386, Dianne Feinstein,
a U.S. Senator from California, introduced S. 1350, the Notification of Risk to Personal Data
Act (NORPDA).209 Many of the provisions in NORPDA are borrowed directly from SB 1386.
Unfortunately, many of the borrowed provisions suffer from the same vagueness that plagues SB
1386. There are, however some subtle differences between NORPDA and SB 1386. The notable
provisions in NORPDA are:
• NORPDA defines breach of system security as “the compromise of the security,
confidentiality, or integrity of computerized data that results in, or there is a reasonable
basis to conclude has resulted in, the unauthorized acquisition of and access to personal
information . . .” (emphasis added).210
• Under NORPDA, once a “breach of the security system” is discovered, notice must be sent
to United States residents whose “unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably
believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.”211 This notice provision
is obviously much broader than SB 1386 because it clearly would have international
implications and affect every database owner in the world maintaining personal
information (as defined in NORPDA) on U.S. residents.212
• NORPDA applies to agencies and persons engaged in interstate commerce. “Agency”
includes most governmental bodies, the most notable exceptions being the Congress and
the federal courts.213
• Like SB 1386, NORPDA does not require an organization to give notice of a breach if it
already “maintains its own reasonable notification provisions as part of an information
security policy for the treatment of personal information” and it actually “notifies subject
persons in accordance with its information security policy in the event of a breach of
security of the system.”214 (emphasis added). NORPDA, however, goes further than
SB 1386 by defining acceptable notification procedures. In order for its “notification
provisions” to be deemed “reasonable”, an organization must:
o “use a security program reasonably designed to block unauthorized transactions
before they are charged to the customer’s account”215
o use a security program that requires notice to data subjects “after the security
program indicates that the breach of the system has resulted in fraud or
unauthorized transactions, but does not necessarily require notice under other
circumstances” 216
o be “subject to examination for compliance with this Act by 1 or more Federal
functional regulators (as defined in section 509 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15
U.S.C. section 6809)[217], with respect to the operation of the security program and
the notification procedures.” 218
• Rather than authorizing a private right of action for damages, as allowed in SB 1386,
NORPDA provides civil remedies ($5,000 per violation and up to $25,000 per day while
the violation persists) that must be enforced by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 219
NORPDA does not, however, expressly or implicitly exempt organizations from private suits
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and class-actions in the event of a breach.220
• Like SB 1386, NORPDA would allow equitable relief to enjoin ongoing or proposed
violations of its provisions. Unlike SB 1386, however, these equitable actions would need
to be filed by the FTC, not affected data subjects. 221 State Attorneys General would also
be authorized by NORPDA222 to enjoin organizations, enforce compliance with the Act, and
obtain damages, restitution or other compensation on behalf of U.S. residents.223
• NORPDA would not affect other remedies available under law. For example, contract or
negligence actions or actions filed under SB 1386 can still be pursued even if this bill
becomes law. 224 State or local electronic breach notification laws that are inconsistent
with NORPDA will be superseded, “except as provided under sections 1798.82 and
1798.29 of the California Civil Code.”225 Therefore, SB 1386 is preserved, but legislation
on the subject passed by another state would be barred by the Supremacy Clause.226
3. The Identity Theft Consumer Notification Act
{63} In 2002, a former Bank One employee in Wisconsin gave a ring of identity thieves account
information and social security numbers on 250 bank customers.227 Upon discovery of the
theft, Bank One fired the employee but failed to notify its customers.228 Eight months later,
a retiree who was a customer of the bank discovered that a new Jaguar had been purchased
in his name. 229 Once this incident achieved notoriety in the local press, Bank One notified its
customers of the data theft.230
{64} In response to this incident, two members of the U.S. House of Representatives from
Wisconsin, Jerry Kleczka and Paul Ryan, introduced a bill requiring banks to notify customers if
personal data is stolen.231 The highlights of H.R. 818, the Identity Theft Consumer Notification
Act,232 are as follows:
• Notification to consumers would be required “upon discovering that the confidentiality
or security of any nonpublic personal information maintained by the financial institution
with respect to a consumer has been compromised in any way by an employee of the
financial institution, or through any unauthorized entry into the records of the financial
institution.”233 H.R. 818 is, therefore, different from NORPDA and SB 1386 because H.R.
818 is limited to personal information held by financial institutions.
• The language in H.R. 818 does not limit the scope of a security breach to computerized
information. Unlike SB 1386 and NORPDA, it applies to paper records as well.234 As
noted previously, neither NORPDA nor SB 1386 apply to paper records and, therefore,
treat similarly situated identity theft victims differently.
• Unlike SB 1386 and NORPDA, H.R. 818 would require more than mere notice to the
consumer. It would also require that the financial institution assist the consumer in
fixing the problems caused by the breach of security, including correcting and updating
information in consumer credit reports as required by the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 235
H.R. 818 would also expressly require reimbursement for consumer losses incurred as a
result of the breach or misuse of the data, “including any fees for obtaining, investigating,
and correcting a consumer report of such consumer at any consumer reporting
agency.”236 Finally, the financial institution would be required to assist consumers in
repairing damage to their credit arising from the breach.237 Section 618(a) of the bill
would authorize private suit in an appropriate U.S. District Court (without regard for the
amount in controversy) or in any other court of competent jurisdiction.238
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• The statute of limitations provision requires that actions filed under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act must be filed no later than 2 years after the date on which the violation is
discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.239
• Like SB 1386 and NORPDA, H.R. 818 contains a law enforcement safe harbor. H.R. 818’s
provision allows for a temporary “waiver” of the notice requirement “at the request of a
law enforcement agency investigating such violation for such limited period of time as
the law enforcement agency determines is essential for carrying out the investigation.”240
This language is far better than that used for the temporary law enforcement exemptions
under SB 1386 and NORPDA because it makes clear that law enforcement authorities
must make the decision that notification would interfere with the investigation.
V. HOW SHOULD BUSINESSES AND CONSUMERS PROTECT THEMSELVES?
A. Businesses
{65} The best way for an organization to avoid the effect of notification statutes and the litigation
they might spawn is to secure its systems.241 Companies should focus more on front-end security
and avoid quick fixes.242 In order to avoid being a victim of security breaches and avoid problems
with breach notification laws, businesses should consider the following measures:
• Review your organization’s policies243 regarding access to sensitive information in
existing systems and the systems of clients or business partners.244
• Access to personal information should be limited to those authorized persons in your
company who need to know it.245
• Restrict the situations in which access to personal information may be downloaded
and saved to laptops,246 desktop computers247 and other disk media issued to
employees. Employees must be forbidden from transferring personal data maintained
by the organization to the employees’ personal computers.
• Review your organization’s privacy policies posted on its website or in print ads. Make
sure that your company can deliver on the promises made in those policies. For
example, do not promise that all information is encrypted all of the time.
• Review your organization’s password policies, making sure that passwords are not
inadvertently accessible to other employees or outsiders.248
• Create or modify your organization’s procedures for detecting and reporting
breaches.249
• Determine whether your organization already requires the notification of data subjects
whose personal information has been breached in a manner consistent with SB 1386’s
requirements.250 If the procedures do not measure up, modify them so they comply
with the law.
• Determine what “personal information” regarding California residents is contained
on your system and document the information contained on each system.251 Review
your internal and external procedures to determine whether they provide reasonable
protection against breach.252
• Install firewalls253 and authentication protocols to protect personal data.254
• Employ audit trails to track events occurring on the system so you can determine who
(or what) caused them.255
• Employ intrusion detection software256 or other mechanisms by which you can
determine the extent to which the system has been compromised and the extent to
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•

•
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which information has been accessed.257
If your company does not have the skills or the forensic tools necessary to make the
simple determination that there has been a breach, it should acquire those skills and
capabilities immediately or retain the services of companies who specialize in this
area.258
Review and amend any third party storage agreements you have with external data
centers,259 making sure that those agreements require the vendor to notify your
company in the event of a breach.260 If you outsource your data storage, you need
to have your legal counsel revisit those agreements, paying careful attention to
the security provided at the data storage facility.261 Take the time to learn about
the security procedures employed at the storage facility and audit its procedures
periodically.
Educate, train and re-train employees about SB 1386 and the general practices and
legal requirements for securing data.262 Though it is an essential part of an effective
security program under any circumstances, it could also help reduce the possibility of
punitive damages if a negligence action is brought based on the security breach.263
Establish a contingency plan that focuses on preserving and documenting evidence,
especially when the system contains your clients’ or your own trade secrets. 264
Consider whether it is feasible to separate data subjects’ first names, initials and last
names from social security numbers, driver’s license numbers and other account
information on the system. If this can be done without overburdening efficiency, two
systems would have to be breached before notice is required.265
Require that customers periodically update their addresses in your organization’s
database as a condition of online transactions.266
Check your insurance policy to see whether it covers cyber crimes.267 If it does not,
perform due diligence to determine whether cyber insurance is feasible for your
business.
Have the suggestions herein reviewed by a computer security professional and your
legal counsel to ensure that additional or different steps are not required by your
organization’s particular circumstances.

{66} If your system is breached:
• “[T]ake measures to determine the scope of the breach and restore reasonable
integrity to the data system before notifying California residents.”268
• Check to see whether the time/date stamp has been modified on any of the personal
information files.269
• Where feasible, hire a reputable security company to perform any needed forensic
assessment of the breach.270 Using your own organization’s personnel may result
in law enforcement refusing to take action because chain of custody issues will be
clouded by the company’s self-interest potential.271
• Communications between the organization and law enforcement should be
documented wherever possible. Indeed, everything that happens after the breach
must be documented with the degree of care that would be exercised in preparing for
a lawsuit.272
B. Consumers
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{67} When identity theft occurs, it is generally the consumer who is “left to clean up the mess.”273
If you receive an SB 1386 notice from a business or California state agency, you should:
•
•
•
•

•

Closely monitor all credit card and financial statements in search of unusual
activity. Because of the ease with which information spreads, once your identity is
stolen, you must monitor your accounts for years.274
Change your credit card and bank debit accounts immediately.
Notify your bank and credit card companies by phone and in writing and advise
them that you are to be contacted before any new accounts are opened in your
name.
Contact the company that sent you the notice in writing and request as much
information as possible regarding the nature of the breach (to the extent not
covered in the notice), whether the company can confirm whether your personal
information was, in fact, stolen from its system, the status of the investigation,
whether any of the information stolen has been used for illicit purposes and the
company’s plans for fixing the problem.
If it is your employer who suffered the breach: ask the same questions stated
above and contact your union representative, if applicable.
VI. CONCLUSION

{68} Computer security breaches are occurring at an alarming rate, thus causing identity
thefts to soar. Identity thieves are taking advantage of system vulnerabilities caused by some
organizations’ failure to employ effective security measures to protect personal information.
The old paradigm, focusing mainly on criminal prosecution of hackers, has been tried and
has largely failed. Organizations must be held accountable and required to be responsible for
protecting personal information they store in computer databases as well as in file cabinets. The
government has waited long enough for market forces to cause organizations to take computer
security seriously.
{69} By enacting SB 1386, California has established a good starting point for addressing
legislation in this area. The law, however, suffers from too much ambiguity to serve as the final
template for national breach notification legislation. Although the law appears to strike a good
balance between the needs of data subjects and organizations experiencing computer security
breaches, the law fails to provide definitions for key terms that carry multiple meanings. For
example, the law does not define the term “unencrypted” or the phrase “was, or is reasonably
believed to have been, acquired.” These omissions make it difficult for companies to comply
with the law’s ambiguous provisions and will most certainly complicate enforcement. The U.S.
Congress should make sure that the type of encryption demanded under NORPDA or any federal
breach notification legislation is specified clearly in the law.
{70} Furthermore, SB 1386 also fails to address security breaches involving paper records. This
omission is surprising because theft of paper data also gives rise to identity theft. California and
Senator Feinstein should follow the lead of the authors of H.R. 818 and expand the scope of SB
1386 and NORPDA to provide notice to victims of paper record breaches as well.
{71} Moreover, SB 1386 needs to be amended to define or replace the word “customer” in
the provision allowing a private right of action. It simply does not make sense to draft a law
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because of an event involving a breach of state computers that resulted in the disclosure of
California employees’ personal information, yet provide no cause of action for California state
employees against the state. Restricting the right to sue to “customers” also limits the right
of employees to sue their private sector employers (unless the employee also happens to be a
customer) if the employers fail to give them notice of a breach. There is no justifiable reason for
treating employees differently than customers. Both parties provide private information to the
organization with the reasonable expectation that it will be kept safe. Unless there is a method
by which organizations can be held accountable to their employees, employees will remain
viable targets for identity thieves.
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June 18 Judiciary Committee Analysis, supra note 45.

95

LaFlamme, supra note 6.

Jerald M. Savin, Businesses Must Disclose Security Breaches, CALCPA ONLINE, at http://www.calcpa.org/
members/knowledge/articles/webprivacy.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2003).
96

Kevin Poulsen, California Disclosure Law Has National Reach, SECURITYFOCUS, at http://www.securityfocus.com/
news/1984 (Jan. 6, 2003).
97

Benjamin Wright, Data Privacy in California, News in Electronic Commerce Law, at http://
ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/Ben_Wright/e-biz.htm (Feb. 2003). Many businesses have expressed
little concern over the notice provision because they have existing policies which require notice. Konrad, supra
note 27 (citing a spokeswoman for Dell Computer who stated that Dell has had such procedures in place for a long
time); see also Messmer, supra note 91 (quoting an eBay spokesman who claimed that eBay has been breached
numerous times and already has a notification policy); Hulme, supra note 35. Security experts believe, however,
that most businesses outside of the heavily regulated banking and health care sectors are not prepared for dealing
98
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with this law. Hulme, supra note 35.
99

Wright, supra note 98.

See B. Mahadevan and N.S. Venkatesh, A Framework for Building On-Line Trust for Business to Business ECommerce, at http://unix2.iimb.ernet.in/~mahadev/trust1.pdf (Nov. 30, 2000) (discussing the business implications
for interception of online data transmission, as presented at the November 2000 IT Asia Millennium Conference in
Bombay, India); cf. Press Release, Sigaba Corp. Details Top Ten Requirements of a Secure E-Mail Solution, Sigaba
Corp., at http://www.sigaba.com/news/pressreleases/2-27-02tenreq.html (Feb. 27, 2002).
100

101

Litan & Pescatore, supra note 35.

102

StrongAuth, supra note 70.

StrongAuth, supra note 70. The breadth of this provision arguably calls into question the issue of whether
California’s attempt to regulate companies outside the state is an effort to affect interstate commerce, a power
reserved to Congress under the Constitution.
103

104

Poulsen, supra note 97.

105

Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 4.

106

Hackett & Caldwell, supra note 73, at 7.

Erik Laykin, New California Law to Impact Global Business – SB 1386, Online Security, at http://
www.onlinesecurity.com/Community_Forum_detail.php?article_id=102 (Apr. 22, 2003).
107

Messmer, supra note 91 (noting the problems that will occur when databases are not updated to keep track of
consumers who establish new residences).
108

Letter from Ken Wasch, President, Software & Info. Indus. Ass’n, to The Honorable Gray Davis, Governor,
California (Sept. 16, 2002) (on file with Richmond Journal of Law & Technology). Obtaining and storing physical
addresses at the time of the transaction would not necessarily be helpful, because up to 17% of U.S. residents
change their physical address each year. Id.
109

Id. at 3. SB 1386 does not contain a provision allowing for delayed notification while the companies determine
the current addresses of their data subjects. Hackett & Caldwell, supra note 73, at 8. The author of the bill was
asked to remedy this issue by allowing companies to rely on the addresses contained in their records at the time of
the breach, however, this request was declined. Hackett & Caldwell, supra note 73, at 8.
110

Although some critics have argued that this law could cause organizations to avoid collecting and retaining
information regarding California residents, the task of trying to keep California residents out of your database could
prove to be more expensive than complying with the law. If It Weren’t For the Weather, supra note 38. Such a policy
would also be fiscally unsound for businesses seeking to attract customers nationwide. It would also invite legal
liability because an organization can never be totally sure that a person in its database has not become a resident of
California since the time it first obtained that person’s information.
111

April 2003 Update, Montebello Partners, Internet Security Update, at http://www.montebellopartners.com/
Security/Default.asp (April 2003).
112

113

Id. at 5.

114

Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 6.

115

Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 6.

116

If It Weren’t For the Weather, supra note 38.

Deborah Birnbach and Kimberly Nuzum, New Law Requires Disclosure of Security Breaches, Testa, Hurwitz &
Thibeault Client Bulletin, at http://www.tht.com/pubs/SearchMatchPub.asp?ArticleID=939 (May 14, 2003).
117

See Thibodeau, supra note 6 (explaining that companies have to report “not only actual compromises, but
suspected compromises as well.”).
118

The Investment Company Institute (ICI) also complained during California Senate hearings because the bill
requires notice whether or not there is “a suspected or expected case of identity theft resulting from the breach.”
Personal Information, Privacy: Hearing on S.B. 1386 Before the Assembly Committee on Business and Professions,
2002 Leg. (Cal. 2002), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1386_cfa_2-119
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20804_191651_asm_comm.html (Aug. 6, 2002).
120

Id.

Some organizations are already decrying the breadth of SB 1386 as they prepare for difficult implementation.
Meeting Minutes from the University of California at Davis Technology Infrastructure Forum at III, at http:
//tif.ucdavis.edu/meetings/02_26_03/ (Feb. 26, 2003). For example, during the meeting cited herein, some
members noted “that the task of identifying all staff and faculty who store personal information on their computers
is close to impossible.” Id..
121

Personal Information, supra note 119 (estimating that the cost of compliance for the mutual fund industry will
be in the “tens of millions of dollars.”).
122

Laykin, supra note 107, at para. 9; see also Hackett & Caldwell, supra note 73, at 7. Critics complain that the
law creates a gray area that does not make clear what constitutes a “security breach.” Vamosi, supra note 12, at
para. 6.
123

124

Laykin, supra note 107, at para. 9.

125

Vamosi, supra note 12.

126

Konrad, supra note 27.

127

Konrad, supra note 27, at paras. 11, 20.

128

Armour, supra note 22.

129

StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 108.

130

An IDS is defined as follows:
An intrusion detection system is now an essential part of network security defen[s]es.
Firewalls will stop most unwanted traffic. But firewalls need to allow some traffic or there
could be no connection with the Internet. Such ‘legal’ traffic can allow intruders into your
LAN. . . . An intrusion detection system can detect dubious activity on the network. This can
be by recogni[z]ing attack patterns, or by comparing network usage with security policy.
For example, the policy may state that a particular workstation can only be used during
standard office hours. If it logs on at 3:00 am, it would be reasonable to assume that
something untoward is happening.

ITSecurity.com, Firewall, COMPUTER SECURITY DICTIONARY, supra note 53.
131

Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 5.

Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 5; see also Marcia Savage, California Security Law Could Bring
Opportunity, CRN.com, at http://www.crn.com/sections/News/top_news.asp?ArticleID=42043 (May 16, 2003)
(suggesting that small or less security-savvy companies could claim that they did not report a breach because they
did not know about it).
132

Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 6. Organizations should be careful not assume that ignorance is bliss
under SB 1386. Failing to monitor an organization’s system in order to avoid discovering breaches that might
trigger the notice provision would be ill-advised. StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 109. Ignoring or outright
avoiding information that might indicate that an organization’s system is insecure could result in a finding that the
organization has violated the standard of care in the industry and was, therefore, negligent. Id. Even if such a “see
no evil hear no evil” policy could avoid liability under SB 1386, the damage to an organization’s reputation when
this fact is eventually exposed could be far more costly than the cost of compliance. Id.
133

Poulsen, supra note 97, at para. 3. The statute also fails to define the word “compromised.” One commentator
aptly noted that “[o]nly God, or the California Supreme Court, whichever has higher jurisdiction, knows what the
word ‘compromises’ means.” Posting of Tom Frerichs to TalkBack (April 28, 2003), at http://forums.zdnet.com/
group/zd.Anchordesk/anchordesk/anchordesktb.tpt/@thread@93153@forward@1@D-,D@ALL/@article@93153?EX
P=ALL&VWM=hr&ROS=1& (commenting on Vamosi, supra note 12). It is, therefore, impossible to know for certain
when an intrusion has resulted in a compromise. Armour, supra note 22, at para. 12.
134

135

Poulsen, supra note 97, at para. 10.

136

There is also a serious question as to whether a single incident or even a handful of incidents involving data
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subjects with information stored on a breached system would motivate an organization to find that the acquisition
of data resulted from the breach of the Defendant’s system, as opposed to acquisition from some other source (i.e.
credit card receipts stolen from the garbage, interception of data in other internet transactions, etc.).
One company advertises that with its software, “organizations can forensically examine an incident in order to
determine with 100 percent accuracy what information was accessed, created or deleted.” Press Release, Guidance
Software’s Encase Enterprises Provides Incident Response Capabilities Needs to Support Compliance of California
Law SB 1386, Guidance Software, at http://www.guidancesoftware.com/corporate/press/2003/20030414.shm
(Apr. 14, 2003).
137

Thibodeau, supra note 6 (noting that while an organization may know when someone has hacked into the system,
the organization can’t “know if [the hacker has] acquired information or if they have just looked at information
. . . [p]otentially, you will have to send out notices to a lot of people just because you don’t know” whether the
information itself has been acquired.)
138

139

StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 108.

140

StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 108.

Of course, if that organization’s data subjects suffer a rash of identity thefts, a company could be deemed to have
a reasonable belief that data acquisition has occurred.
141

142

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(d).

143

Armour, supra note 22, at 3.

Susan J. Wells, Stolen Identity: When Employees Suffer From Identity Theft, Employers Also Pay the Price, HR
MAGAZINE (reprinted by MSNBC) available at http://www.ucan.org/News/MSNBC1-12-03/msnbc.htm (Dec. 1, 2002).
144

145

Id.

146

Id.

147

Id.

148

Id.

149

Id.

“The most common definition of physical security is that it is the application of physical barriers and control
procedures to protect information and information systems.” ITSecurity.com, COMPUTER SECURITY DICTIONARY, Security,
supra note 53.
150

Security: Identity Theft, HIPAA Implementation Newsletter, LPF.com, at http://www.lpf.com/hipaa/issue53.html
(March 14, 2003).
151

152

Laykin, supra note 107, at 2.

California Law Protecting Computerized Personal Information Takes Effect in July, Segal Compliance Alert, at
http://www.segalco.com/publications/compliancealert/31903.html (March 19, 2003). Before passage, many
opponents also noted their fear that SB 1386 would launch the creation of a complex and confusing patchwork
of state legislation on this subject that would give rise to preemption issues where those state laws conflict with
federal legislation on related topics. August 14 Appropriations Committee Analysis, supra note 78 (recounting that
the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) noted its concern about piece-meal creation of different
legislation at the state level). There have also been unsubstantiated allegations that SB 1386 may violate “current
international conventions, directives, regulations or obligations.” Saundra Kae Rubel, News You Can Use – Got
California Customers? There’s a New Law For You, Privacy Knowledge Base, at http://www.privacyknowledgebase.co
m/newsUse017_s.jsp (July 9, 2003).
153

154

If It Weren’t For the Weather, supra note 38.

Will CA Law Spur Storage Crypto?, Light Reading.com, at http://www.byteandswitch.com/document.asp?doc_id=
31689&site=byteandswitch (April 22, 2003).
155

156

StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 201(l).

Vamosi, supra note 12 (noting that “if customer data is encrypted, a company is exempt,” but explaining that the
strength of the encryption is not dictated by the law); see also Will CA Law Spur Storage Crypto?, supra note 154;
157
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Hurley, supra note 68 (quoting Scott Pink, deputy chairman of the American Bar Association’s Cybersecurity Task
Force, who asks, “What if a company uses encryption that can be unscrambled by anyone?”. Although the law does
not specify the type of encryption to be used, the “spirit” of the law requires that the data be protected. StrongAuth,
supra note 70, at § 201(l).
158

Poulsen, supra note 97.

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), NIST Special Publication 800-18, Computer Security
Research Center, at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/ 800-18/Planguide.PDF (Dec. 1998). Saying that
the notice requirement does not apply to “encrypted” information simply begs the question. NIST requires federal
government system owners to answer the following questions once they state in their System Security Plan that
they employ decryption: “What cryptographic methodology (e.g., secret key and public key) is used? If a specific offthe-shelf product is used, provide the name of the product. . . . If the product and the implementation method meet
federal standards (e.g., Data Encryption Standard, Digital Signature Standard), include that information.” Id. at 62.
Does the system follow Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140 Level 1, which is used by the federal
government for protecting classified information? Id. SB 1386 does not address any of these issues.
159

Most companies and government organizations (with the exception of the Department of Defense and other
agencies storing classified information) use authentication schemes that were developed in the 1960s, even
though stronger authentication has existed for the past twenty years. StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 304. Ninetynine percent of the passwords used in these single-authentication schemes can be cracked in less than a half hour.
Id. The Department of Defense, however, employs Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140 Level 1.
FIPS 140 Level 1 is “the most widely recognized encryption benchmark for cryptographic security best practices.”
See Protegrity Secure, Data(t) Database Security Software to Offer Rsa Bsafe Encryption Software, ITSecurity.com,
at http://www.itsecurity.com/tecsnews/mar2003/mar144.htm (Mar. 13, 2003). This standard is “the most
stringent government, industry and internal auditing standard for protecting the privacy of sensitive database
information against external threats.” Id.
160

The price for many encryption modules starts at $25,000 and goes up depending on the number of databases
and CPU’s requiring configuration. Protegrity Secure,Data(t) Database Security Software to offer Rsa Bsafe
Encryption Software, supra note 160.
161

162

Cf. Will CA Law Spur Storage Crypto?, supra note 155 (discussing firewalls).

163

Cf. Will CA Law Spur Storage Crypto?, supra note 155.

164

StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 201(l).

165

See Will CA Law Spur Storage Crypto?, supra note 155.

SSL is “[a] protocol originally developed by Netscape. It is a web encryption technology, mostly used by ecommerce web pages throughout the world, to allow safe transactions without the risk of data eavesdropping
by third parties. It was developed to enable the secure transmission of documents over the Internet. SSL
creates a ‘secure’ connection between the client and host, enabling confidentiality of information transmitted.”
ITsecurity.com, SSL, COMPUTER SECURITY DICTIONARY, supra note 53. SSL is:
166

[A] public key encryption scheme that uses both public and private keys to authenticate
users and provide secure communication between the browser and a website. Part of this
process involves the server (the website) sending the client (the browser) its certificate. The
certificate is provided by a CA, and guarantees the server’s authenticity so that the user can
be confident about what resource the browser is talking to. After this key exchange takes
place, a shared secret key is used to encrypt the data between browser and website. The
existence of an SSL communication is indicated by a padlock icon in the bottom right hand
corner of the browser screen.
Id. Technically, SSL has been superseded by Transport Layer Security (TLS). “TLS is an Internet security
protocol based on and very similar to SSL version 3. It provides end-to-end encryption.” Id. Most people,
however, still refer to this technology as SSL.
167

StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 201(h).

168

StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 201(h).

169

Cf. Will CA Law Spur Storage Crypto?, supra note 155. See generally Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 6
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(noting that encrypting files only while in transit will not be enough). If the California Senate did not intend to require
encryption while the information is at rest on the hard drive as well as in transit, encryption would not have assisted
in securing the data lost in the Teale Data Center incident. The Teale Data Center data was sitting on a server at
the time the system was attacked. It was not in transit. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 46. Generally, one would
assume that a legislature at least hoped fix the problem that gave rise to the legislation.
170

Cf. Will CA Law Spur Storage Crypto?, supra note 155 (discussing firewalls).

171

Cf. Will CA Law Spur Storage Crypto?, supra note 155.

172

Wright, supra note 98, at § 6.

173

See If It Weren’t For the Weather, supra note 38.

174

See If It Weren’t For the Weather, supra note 38.

Hal R. Varian, Managing Online Security Risks, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2000, at C2, available at http://
www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/people/hal/NYTimes/2000-06-01.html (citing Ross Anderson, Why Cryptosystems
Fail, at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/wcf.ps.gz (2000)).
175

Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 6 (recommending that organizations assure that encryption key
management systems are efficient and secure).
176

177

Savin, supra note 92.

178

If It Weren’t For the Weather, supra note 38.

179

If It Weren’t For the Weather, supra note 38.

The provision that exempts “encrypted data” from the definition of “personal information,” the theft of which
triggers the notice requirement, was not added until the bill was amended in Assembly on July 25, 2002. SB
1386, July Amendment, supra note 85. In the Assembly Committee summary and analysis discussing the July 25
amendments, encryption was referred to as a “safe harbor.” Personal Information, supra note 119. An analysis of
this committee meeting notes, however, that while these safe harbors generally exempt the exposure of encrypted
personal information from the provisions of this bill, encrypted personal information that has been both accessed
and decrypted by a hacker would trigger the bill’s disclosure requirements. Id.
180

See Personal Information, supra note 119 (“encrypted personal information that has been both accessed and
decrypted by a hacker would trigger the bill’s disclosure requirements”); see also Poulsen, supra note 97 (questioning
whether a company would be liable if someone breaches the system and subsequently steals and decrypts poorly
encrypted information). In this situation, the organization may need to provide notice after a certain number of data
subjects have reported facts suggesting identity theft because at this point, a court may find that the organization
acquired a reasonable belief that “unencrypted” personal information has been acquired as a result of the breach
(thus triggering the notice provision). This may be the outcome even though the data was encrypted at the time it
was stolen.
181

182

Poulsen, supra note 97.

183

StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 201(l).

184

StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 201(l).

Analysis of August 5, 2002 Amendments to SB 1386, Franchise Tax Board, available at http://www.ftb.ca.gov/
other/legis/01_02absb/SB1386_080502.pdf (Aug. 15, 2002).
185

Id. Temporary relief is given from the notice provision so that the breached organization, agency or individual can
have time to evaluate the damage done by the breach and to make sure that the system is free of vulnerabilities
before it is put back online. Id. Before the passage of SB 1386, companies had the option of taking their time
investigating a breach in order to determine whether any damage occurred before they publicly disclosed the incident
to customers. Birnbach & Nuzum, supra note 117.
186

187

Poulsen, supra note 97.

Salkever, supra note 2 (referring to this exemption as a “loophole” that must be closed if similar legislation is
going to be considered on a national level).
188

StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 201(o). Contra Savage, supra note 132 (suggesting that the law probably will not
be enforced).
189
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This assumes, of course, that contacting data subjects themselves to determine whether there has been unusual
activity on their accounts would not be part of the investigation. It would appear that this is something police would
do fairly early on in any investigation.
190

191

Poulsen, supra note 97.

192

Birnbach & Nuzum, supra note 117.

193

Birnbach & Nuzum, supra note 117.

During hearings prior to the passage of SB 1386, the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA)
noted its concern that there was no cap on liability included in the bill. August 14 Appropriations Committee
Analysis, supra note 78.
194

It may also be difficult to show that the defendant’s breach caused the damage as opposed to some other
method of accessing the same information. For example, if the plaintiff’s social security number was accessed
during the breach, it may be difficult to show that the breach of its system caused the damage, especially in light
of the fact that millions of people in business and government have access to Social Security Numbers. See Foley
Testimony, supra note 28 (discussing the fact that social security numbers are accessible to a large number of
people).
195

For example, if the breached system contained certain educational records, banking or financial information,
medical records or other personally identifying information, there are federal laws already in place to generally
define the parameters of the security program that must be implemented in order to protect that information. For
example, under Graham-Leach-Bliley (GLB), the FTC is requiring that financial institutions develop a written security
plan for safeguarding financial records. Personal Information, supra note 119, at 6. This “Safeguards Rule”
will effectively require financial institutions covered by GLB to encrypt personal financial data belonging to their
customers. Id.
196

Absent a contract expressly delegating the risk of breach to one party or the other, breach of contract actions
in this area will likely arise as a breach warranty claim (i.e. system security promises made at the point of data
collection that are not kept). Although there is little precedent to draw upon to define the exact scope of the duty
to protect information from a computer security breach, there are some settled cases that teach valuable lessons
in securing information. A perfect example of such a case is In the Matter of Ziff-Davis Media, Inc., a case arising
when Ziff Davis Media, Inc., created a web page on which consumers could submit their personal information in
order to obtain a free short-term subscription. In the Matter of Ziff Davis Media, Inc., Assurance of Discontinuance,
at http://www.research.att.com/courses/nyu/b20-3156/ZDMAssurance.pdf (2002). If customers wanted to
subscribe beyond the free period, they could enter their credit card information. On November 19, 2001, Ziff-Davis
learned that the database containing this information was accessible to the general public. Id. The database
contained personal information on 12,000 subscribers. Id. Fifty of these subscribers had entered their credit card
information into the database. Id. The data submitted to the web page was visible in HTML source code and was
transmitted to Ziff Davis’ server in an unencrypted format. Id. The subscriber data file was actually stored on the
same publicly accessible server as the web page in an unencrypted flat file with no authentication controls. Id.
197

After learning of the breach, Ziff-Davis deleted the data from the server, but left the promotional web page
online. Because of the web page design, the deleted data file was automatically recreated. Id. at 3. Within an
hour, Ziff-Davis disabled the subscription web page. Id. at 3. The information was then moved to a more secure
site and was encrypted. Id. Because it had disabled the logging function on its server, Ziff-Davis could not assess
the extent of the intrusion or identify its cause. Id.
On its web site, Ziff-Davis had a privacy and security policy that promised that “reasonable precautions”
were taken to keep disclosed personal information secure. Id. The states of New York, California, and Vermont
threatened suit under their respective statutes protecting consumers from fraudulent or deceptive trade practices.
Id. at 4. Ziff-Davis’ potential liability stemmed mainly from its website privacy policy, which promised reasonable
precautions would be taken to protect information collected by the site. Brian McWilliams, Website Security Flaw
Costs ZD, Wired News, at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,54817,00.html (Aug. 28, 2002).
At least five of the consumers whose credit card information was stolen had fraudulent charges made to
their accounts. Id. The investigation, led by the New York State Attorney General’s Office, revealed that Ziff-Davis
failed to follow what the DA referred to as “industry standards” in the area of system security because it failed
to encrypt or password protect the information and failed to take measures to account for whom had access to
the information. Id. David Stampley, the New York assistant attorney general who handled the case, stated that
“Acts such as failing to use SSL encryption and disabling Web server logging indicate an ongoing failure to follow
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standard security practices.” Id.
The settlement included a $100,000 payment to the New York State Department of Law and $50 apiece
to 50 customers whose credit card information had been exposed. LaFlamme, supra note 6. The $100,000 paid
to the State of New York was divided amongst the three states involved in order to cover administrative costs and
other expenses. Website Security Flaw Costs ZD, infra. Under part of the terms of the settlement agreement, ZiffDavis was required to encrypt sensitive information “during transmission from consumers”, “monitor and control
server activity”, “review applications for security weaknesses before installation,” and “establish employee training
and overall risk identification protocols.” Press Release, Major Tech Publisher Reaches Agreement With Attorney
General on E-Commerce Standards, Office of the New York State Attorney General, at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
press/2002/aug/aug28a_02.html (Aug. 28, 2002). The settlement terms required Ziff-Davis to employ a riskbased security program that included adherence to “standard practices relating to privacy, security, and integrity
of Consumer data, where such standards have sufficient industry acceptance and adoption such that Ziff Davis’
adherence to the standards would not unreasonably place Ziff Davis at a competitive disadvantage.” Assurance of
Discontinuance, infra, at 5 (para. 24(d)). Ziff-Davis was also required to “store Consumer data in a database that
cannot be meaningfully interpreted if opened as a flat plain-text file” and to “encrypt the transmission of Sensitive
Consumer data” (as defined by the agreement). Id.
Nancy L. Ober & Dylan W. Wiseman, Theft of Computerized Personal Information Will Trigger New Notice
Obligations for Employers Conducting Business in California, Littler Mendelson website, at http://www.littler.com/
nwsltr/asap_theft.htm (June 2003).
198

199

See Coleman, supra note 46.

200

LaFlamme, supra note 6.

Despite this, some organizations argue that SB 1386 is not flexible enough. On September 16, 2002, Ken Wasch,
the President of the Software & Information Industry Association (SIIA), sent a letter to Gray Davis, Governor of
California, urging him to veto SB 1386. Letter from Ken Wasch, supra note 109. In urging the veto of this bill, SIIA
cited that prominent government groups have been unable to reach consensus on standards to be applied in the
private sector for addressing security concerns. Id. SIIA argued that the FTC Advisory Committee on Online Access
and Security found that
201

[A] security program should be appropriate to its circumstances. This standard, which must
be defined case by case, is sufficiently flexible to take into account changing security needs
over time as well as the particular circumstances of the Web site – including the risk it faces,
the costs of protection, and the data it must protect.
Id. SIIA argued that SB 1386 does not allow the flexibility companies need to determine whether a particular breach
will pose an actual danger to the subject’s personal information. Id.
For example, as part of the implementation of Graham-Leach-Bliley (“GLB”), the FTC is requiring that financial
institutions develop a written security plan for safeguarding financial records. Personal Information, supra note 119,
at 6. This so-called “Safeguards Rule” will effectively require financial institutions covered by GLB to encrypt personal
data belonging to their customers. Id.
202

Under the Privacy Act, government contractors are treated like government agencies, which must
establish appropriate administrative, technical and physical safeguards to insure the security and
confidentiality of records and to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to their security
or integrity which could result in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to
any individual on whom information is maintained.
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
Salkever, supra note 10 (noting that this law defies efforts by the Bush Administration to promote secrecy in such
matters where information is provided to the government as part of homeland defense under the Homeland Security
Act).
203

Poulsen, supra note 97. The Australian Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner (OFPC) similarly encourages
reporting of breaches as best practice, but does not require it. Privacy and Security: Corporate Governance Issues for
Business, SIFT Tactical Information Control, at http://www.sift.com.au/research.asp?data=0508010B4D010301070
14B7043545D4E484B5241545141565C494B (Sept. 2002).
204

205

In passing SB 1386, California has “bucked the trend set by President Bush’s Critical Infrastructure Team,” which
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has leaned towards coaxing rather than forcing non-government organizations to report breaches. Laykin, supra
note 107.
Patrick Thibodeau, California Leads the Way on ID Theft Legislation, COMPUTERWORLD, at http://
www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/privacy/story/0,10801,76721,00.html (Dec. 13, 2002). This
policy is best exemplified in the Freedom of Information Act exemption for businesses that share information with
the government pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002. See LaFlamme, supra note 6.
206

207

Vamosi, supra note 12.

208

Laykin, supra note 107.

209

Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act (NORPDA), S. 1350, 108th Cong. § 2(1)(A) (2003).

Id. Although the term “access” is generally used to describe the process by which a user gets onto a computer
system so he can use its files, the term technically involves “the interaction between a subject (usually a user,
but could be a program or another IT device) and an object (such as a computer, a file or a device attached to the
computer) that results in the flow of information from one to the other.” ITSecurity.com, Access, COMPUTER SECURITY
DICTIONARY, supra note 53.
210

The use of the phrase “acquisition of and access to” in reference to personal information in NORPDA is
ambiguous. As used in this NORPDA provision, it appears that the addition of the term “and access to” is designed
to address situations where information is acquired during a breach of information transmitted in encrypted format
(thus not requiring notification to data subjects), and the organization experiencing the breach later determines
that the encrypted information has been decrypted (thus requiring notification). If the encryption is defeated, the
information will have been both acquired (when stolen in encrypted format) and accessed (when decrypted after
theft).
The word “access” can also, however, refer to a level of activity that is something less than acquisition.
For example, if someone bypasses the security necessary to view information, that person is said to have
“accessed” the information. The information has not necessarily been acquired (i.e., printed, downloaded, written
down). It has merely been made available to the intruder. In NORPDA, however, “acquisition” and “access” appear
to be used to describe a series of events. Because the word “acquisition” is followed by the word “access”, it
appears that access is something that occurs after acquisition as used in this context. It, therefore, appears that
“access” refers to the decryption of information that was encrypted at the time of its theft. This should be clarified
before enactment and the word “decryption” should be used instead of “access” if that is the legislative intent.
211

NORPDA, supra note 209.

Like so many other terms used in the NORPDA and SB 1386, “resident of the United States” is not defined.
Under federal estate gift tax law, residency is determined by analyzing a group of factors that include: (1) the
location of real estate owned by the person; (2) the person’s purpose for currently being in the United States; and
(3) statements the person has made in legal documents regarding his/her intent to remain in the U.S. E.g., U.S.
Resident Defined, EP.com, at http://www.estateprotector.com/who_needs/Non-U_S_Citizens/resident_defined.htm
(last modified Sept. 9, 2003). This standard is very subjective, but it certainly applies to citizens of foreign countries
who are residing in the U.S.
212

NORPDA, supra note 209. “Agency,” as used in NORPDA and the Administrative Procedure Act, includes: (1) the
Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not
include - (A) the Congress; (B) the courts of the United States; (C) the governments of the territories or possessions
of the United States; (D) the government of the District of Columbia; or except as to the requirements of section
552 of this title - (E) agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives of organizations of
the parties to the disputes determined by them; (F) courts martial and military commissions; (G) military authority
exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory; or (H) functions conferred by sections 1738, 1739,
1743, and 1744 of title 12; chapter 2 of title 41; subchapter II of chapter 471 of title 49; or sections 1884, 18911902, and former section 1641(b)(2), of title 50, appendix. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2000).
213

NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 3(a)(6))(A), (B). This appears to be much broader than the scope of persons to
whom notice must be given under SB 1386. Although NORPDA states in Section 3(a)(1) that notice must be given
to “United States residents” whose personal information is reasonably believed to have been acquired, the provision
discussing “Alternative Notification Procedures” states that, in order to avoid using NORPDA’s notice requirements,
the agency or person must already have notification procedures in place for notifying “subject persons” of the
breach. Id. at 3(a)(6). “Subject persons” is a broader category than “United States Citizens.” Id. at § (3)(a)(6).
214
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Therefore, an organization’s reasonable notification provision may have to provide for notice to all data subjects,
including international customers. See NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 4(a)(1))(C) (authorizing suit by State Attorneys
General on behalf of U.S. residents).
215

NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 3(a)(7)(A).

216

NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 3(a)(7)(B).

According to the Commerce and Trade Privacy provisions beginning at 15 U.S.C. § 6809, a “Federal functional
regulator” is: (A) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; (B) the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency; (C) the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; (D) the Director of the Office
of Thrift Supervision; (E) the National Credit Union Administration Board; and (F) the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Id. § 6809(2).
217

One of the regulations drafted pursuant to Health Information Protection and Portability Act (HIPAA) is
the “Security and Electronic Signature Standards.” “The security standards require any health plan, health care
clearinghouse, or health care provider that maintains or transmits electronic health information to assess its security
risks and needs. The organization must then devise, implement, and maintain appropriate security measures.
Anyone receiving health information from them must comply with the same security standards.” Joshua Schmidt,
HIPAA Requires Data and Computer Security, at http://fortress.wa.gov/dshs/maa/DSHSHIPAA/attachments/pdf/
datacomputersecurity.pdf (last modified Jun. 3, 2003). This requires health care providers to develop and implement
administrative procedures as well as physical and technical safeguards to ensure the confidentiality of health
information. Id.
218

NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 3(a)(7)(C).

219

NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 3(b)(1), (c).

220

Singel, supra note 89.

221

NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 3(b)(2).

NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 4(a)(2)(B). Barring an emergency, the State Attorney General must first notify the
U.S. Attorney General of his/her intent to file under NORPDA. Id.
222

NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 4(a)(1). As noted above, because Section 4(a)(1)(c) authorizes suit on behalf of
U.S. residents, and not merely U.S. citizens, citizens of other countries who are residing in the U.S. may bring suit
through the State Attorney General’s Office. Of course, if only U.S. residents can bring suit through the state, U.S.
citizens residing abroad could not use this enforcement method. They would be left to pursue their remedies through
the FTC under NORPDA § 3(a)(7))(B).
223

224

NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 3(b)(3).

225

NORPDA, supra note 209, at § 5.

E.g., Security Compliance, ThreatFocus, at http://www.threatfocus.com/security_laws.php (last visited Sept. 10,
2003) (explaining NORPDA’s application of SB 1386 at the federal level); Cf. Hurley, supra note 68 (indicating that
Feinstein’s NORPDA proposal was likely to incur opposition due to its efforts to impose the precepts of SB 1386 at
the federal level).
226

Matthew Heimer & Stephanie Williams, Identity Crisis, SMARTMONEY, at http://www.smartmoney.com/mag/
index.cfm?story=jan03-identity (December 17, 2002). Thieves were able to access the database of Experian, a credit
reporting agency, by posing as representatives of the credit department at Ford Motor Company. Laura Guevin,
Who’s Responsible for Protecting Our Identities, Biometritech.com, at http://www.biometritech.com/features/
laura4.htm (May 30, 2002). There were 13,000 names in the database, including some Ford customers. Id. A
Ford spokesman said that the system had not been hacked into. Id. He said that someone either bypassed the
security interface or used some type of software to gain access. Id. When pressed for more detail on the nature of
the break-in, the spokesman stated that the exact nature of the breach was a matter for the FBI to resolve. Id. Ford
eventually notified all 13,000 consumers of the breach even though they were not all Ford customers. Jay Lyman,
Hackers Expose Consumer Info from Ford, Experian, News Factor Network, at http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/
story/17826.html (May 17, 2002). The California Senate was influenced by the Ford/Experian incident and, despite
Ford’s initial delay in reporting the incident, applauded the fact that Ford notified all persons affected as the standard
of reporting practice it hoped to achieve in SB 1386. Personal Information, supra note 119, at 4.
227

228

Heimer & Williams, supra note 227.
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229

Heimer & Williams, supra note 227.

Heimer & Williams, supra note 227. Bank One now requires the disclosure of all breaches, but not many other
financial institutions have followed its example. Id.
230

The Identity Theft Consumer Notification Act was originally introduced as H.R. 5474 during the 107th Congress,
but was filed too late in the session for the House to take any action. This same bill was refiled as H.R. 818 in
the 108th Congress on February 13, 2003. Identity Theft Consumer Notification Act, H.R. 818, 108th Cong. (1st
Session 2003), available at http://www.theorator.com/bills108/hr818.html.
231

232

Id.

233

Id. at § 2(a)(5).

Notice must be given of the “compromise of the security or confidentiality of such information, and any misuse
of such information, that the financial institution discovers or reasonably should discover has occurred.” Id. §
2(a)(5)(A).
234

235

Id. § 2(a)(5)(B).

236

Id. § 2(a)(5)(C).

237

Id. § 2(a)(5)(D).

238

Id. § 618(a).

239

Id.

240

Id. § 2(b)&(c).

241

Salkever, supra note 10.

242

For example, employing encryption in an otherwise poorly secured environment is of little value.

It is not only large companies that need to review their policies. Smaller businesses, including law firms, should
review their security practices in light of this law. LaFlamme, supra note 6.
243

244

Rubel, supra note 153.

Id. This is called “logical access control.” It is a process by which the information particular users may access is
limited. It can be used to control access to systems or resources, but can also be used to control the type of access
the user will have to different parts of the system. NIST SP 800-18, supra note 159.
245

Organizations can mitigate their risks by keeping track of the information on employees’ laptop computers.
Without careful attention to where your data is stored, a lost laptop could require notice to all customers of a
breach even though the laptop may have contained limited personal information. April 2003 Update, supra note
112.
246

The law will apply if your company takes credit applications from customers and stores them on a laptop or
a desktop. It also applies of your company downloads credit reports or maintains employee files on its systems
with respect to California residents. See Posting by Site Administrator, Privacy Law Puts the Onus on Business,
Cybernautix, Inc., at http://cybernaut.com (Mar. 18, 2003, 10:18:00 AM).
247

248

Messmer, supra note 91.

249

Rubel, supra note 153.

250

Ober & Wiseman, supra note 198.

251

Ober & Wiseman, supra note 198.

252

Ober & Wiseman, supra note 198.

Installing a firewall alone is not enough, mainly because most attacks on personal data come from inside the
firewall or through illegitimate access to a legitimate user’s identification and authentication that allows outside
users to go through the firewall. StrongAuth, supra note 70, at § 201(g).
253

254

Rubel, supra note 153.

Audit trails are a crucial part of any security program. “The Audit Trail is a record of all events that take place on
a system, and across a network. It should provide a trace of user actions so that security events can be related to
255
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the actions of a specific individual, and is therefore the basis of the accountability requirement for a secure system.”
ITSecurity.com, Audit Trail, COMPUTER SECURITY DICTIONARY, supra note 53.
Audit trails allow an organization to record in audit logs information such as types of events, when
the events occurred, the user ID associated with the events, and the program or command used to initiate
the events. Marianne Swanson, Special Publication (SP) 800-18, Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech. at 45
(1998). They are also useful for establishing individual accountability, reconstructing events, assisting in
intrusion detection, and general system problem identification. Id. An organization’s audit trail policies, like
all other security policies, should be reviewed for legal sufficiency by the organization’s legal counsel.
Businesses may need to invest “thousands” of dollars in equipment upgrades and infrastructure to track
intrusions. Laykin, supra note 107. Small to medium sized businesses may see their labor costs soar as a result of
“24/7” tracking and monitoring the California residents’ information. Id.
256

Randy Sabett, State of Confusion, Information Security, at http://www.infosecuritymag.com/2003/jun/
lawandregs.shtml (June 2003).
257

258

Savage, supra note 132 (suggesting that the law probably will not be enforced).

259

Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 5.

260

Ober & Wiseman, supra note 198.

261

Birnbach & Nuzum, supra note 117, at 6.

262

Hurley, supra note 68; see also Ober & Wiseman, supra note 198; Rubel, supra note 153.

Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 6 (noting that developing employee training programs, conducting
continuous re-training, and generating written policies will go far in reducing the likelihood of consequential or
punitive damages).
263

264

Ober & Wiseman, supra note 198.

265

Hulme, supra note 35.

Although certainly not foolproof, this may at least show that an effort was made to keep track of a data subject’s
residency. This type of prophylactic device may not save an organization from an adverse interpretation by a
California court, but it may go a long way towards showing a good faith effort to keep track of data subjects who
become California residents without the organization’s knowledge. All customers should be required to update their
information as a condition of the transaction because, as stated above, it is just as important to determine when
a data subject from another state has become a resident of California as it is to establish that customers are still
California residents for notice purposes.
266

The California legislation may be a boon to the insurance industry, which has been waiting for the government to
impose standards that will convince corporations that they must develop comprehensive computer security policies.
Security: Identity Theft, supra note 151.
267

The rise in identity theft is resulting in two relatively new types of insurance. One type would protect
individuals from identity thieves by reimbursing them for many of the expenses associated with reclaiming their
identities. Patricia Sabatini, As Identity Theft Grows, Insurers Offer Coverage, THE ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., July 1, 2003,
available at http://www.kmci.com/kshb/news/article/0,1925,KSHB_9418_2080641,00.html. ID theft insurance
generally covers costs such as “telephone calls, photocopying, notary and mailing expenses, lost wages for time away
from work to make court dates and the like, certain attorney’s fees” and fees for future credit reports where needed
to restore the individual’s credit history. Id. The cost is approximately $25 for $15,000 worth of basic coverage with
a $100 deductible. Id.
Businesses are also purchasing “cyberliability” policies to protect themselves in the event of a breach. Ilena
Armstrong, A Risky Business, SCMAGAZINE, at http://www.scmagazine.com/scmagazine/2003_07/feature_2 (July
2003). Because of the uncertainty of liability in this area and the lack of actuary tables and hard data regarding
the frequency of attacks (mainly because most go unreported), these policies are more difficult to find. Id. The cost
of these policies are generally dependent on the quality of the insured’s computer security program. Id. Insurance
companies will ensure that their policyholders employ sound security practices in exchange for more favorable rates.
Varian, supra note 175. Laws such as SB 1386 may, therefore, have the effect of driving down the cost of such
insurance as companies report their breaches and improve their security programs. Cliff May, Basing Cybersecurity
Policies on Standards, SCMAGAZINE, at http://www.scmagazine.com/scmagazine/2003_07/feature_2 (July 2003);
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see also Benjamin Wright, & Steve Haase, Legal Liability: The Computer Imperative, at http://www.pestpatrol.com/
Whitepapers/PestImperative0303.asp (July 2003). Such insurance should only be purchased after a full costbenefit analysis and should be used to supplement, not replace a robust security program. See Armstrong, supra;
Wright & Haase, supra (noting that the public trust lost as a result of a breach may far exceed any monetary
damage directly linked to the occurrence).
268

Piper Rudnick Alert, supra note 29, at 5.

269

Savage, supra note 132 (suggesting that the law probably will not be enforced).

270

Ober & Wiseman, supra note 198.

271

Ober & Wiseman, supra note 198.

272

StrongAuth, supra note 70, § 201(o).
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Heimer & Williams, supra note 227.
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Wells, supra note 144.
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